The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True and Logical Precedent by Lantagne, Stacey M.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 33 | Number 2 Article 1
1-1-2011
The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for
True and Logical Precedent
Stacey M. Lantagne
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stacey M. Lantagne, The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True and Logical Precedent, 33 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 159
(2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol33/iss2/1
The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction:
The Need for True and Logical Precedent
by
STACEY M. LANTAGNE
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 159
II. The Background of Copyright Law ................................................................................. 161
A . The Purpose of U .S. Copyright Law ........................................................................ 161
B. Lack of M oral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law ......................................................... 163
III. Fair U se as a D octrine ...................................................................................................... 165
A. Fair Use as Applied to M usical Sampling ............................................................... 165
1. C am pbell.............................................................................................................165
2. C ases Post-C am pbell ......................................................................................... 167
B. Fair Use as Applied to W orks of Fanfiction ........................................................... 168
1. Salinger ............................................................................................................... 169
2. S un trust ............................................................................................................... 17 1
IV. Emotional Arguments Frequently Raised Against Fanfiction.....................................172
A. The Argument That Fanfiction Is Not Aesthetically Pleasing..............................173
B. The Argument That Fanfiction Is Not Real Writing..............................................174
C. The Argument That Characters Are Akin to Authors' Children.........................175
D. The Argument That Only Works in the Public Doman Should Be Used............176
E. The Argument That Fanfiction Writers Should Seek Permission First................176
V. The Influence of Emotional Arguments on Fanfiction Analysis..................................178
V I. C onclusion .......................................................................................................................... 180
I. Introduction
James Murphy is a songwriter.' His band, LCD Soundsystem,
sells hundreds of thousands of albums and has been nominated for
numerous Grammys. Time magazine named one of his songs the
fourth-best song of 2007. When he gives interviews, he indicates,
* J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Boston College. Ms. Lantagne is currently an
associate at Goodwin Procter LLP. She can be reached at staceylantagne@gmail.com.
She wishes to thank all those who provided research assistance in the form of valuable
Internet links and anecdotes.
1. See Sasha Frere-Jones, Let's Dance, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2010, at 39.
2. See id. at 40.
3. See Josh Tyrangiel, The Best Top 10 Lists of the Year: The 10 Best Songs, TIME,
Dec. 24, 2007, at 68.
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"I've always been a good imitator. I love music. But I'm just not that
original."' Similarly, he states, "My life isn't about quoting, but I do
think that's a big part of music."' An approving profile in The New
Yorker profile described his
uncanny ability to hear sonic detail, [which] enables him to
isolate the most notable parts of various songs-Robert
Fripp's guitar sound on David Bowie's "Heroes," the opening
sting of Gang of Four's "Not Great Men"-and then edit,
enhance, and assemble those pieces into an easily felt,
6comprehensible new arrangement.
A few days before The New Yorker published this favorable
profile on James Murphy, a respected musician with a career built on
riffing off other people's songs, the best-selling author Diana
Gabaldon posted an entry on her blog. This entry opened with, "OK,
my position on fan-fic is pretty clear: I think it's immoral, I know it's
illegal, and it makes me want to barf whenever I've inadvertently
encountered some of it involving my characters."'
This is a tale of two creative genres. One borrows from and
creates audio works; the other borrows from books, movies, and
television to create literary works. While the legality of both is in
constant flux, governed by fact-intensive inquiries that sometimes
support and other times condemn the remakes, one genre has
managed to gain a foothold as respected artistry in the community at
large.' The other, however, exists almost entirely on the Internet,
4. Frere-Jones, supra note 1, at 39 (quoting The Guardian).
5. Id. at 42-43.
6. Id. at 39.
7. Diane Gabaldon, Fan-Fiction and Moral Conundrums (May 3, 2010),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1TwhnQt7eeAJ:syndicated.livejo
urnal.com/dianagabaldon/23372.html+fan+fiction+and+moral+conundrums&cd=3&hl=
en&ct=clnk&client=firefox-a; see also Robin Hobb, The Fan Fiction Rant,
ROBINHOBB.COM (June 30, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20050630015105/http://
www.robinhobb.com/rant.html ("I am not rational on the topic of fan fiction."); Lee
Goldberg, Hot Button Topics with Mystery Writers, A WRITER'S LIFE (Apr. 25, 2005),
http://Ieegoldberg.typepad.com/a writers-life/2005/04/hotbuttontopi.html[hereinafter
Hot Button Topics] ("Fanfiction: It creeps out most of the authors I spoke to. . . .").
8. See John Schietinger, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the
Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 209, 209
(2005) (discussing an album containing thousands of samples that had been named "the
best dance album of all time").
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commonly belittled as immoral,9 not "real" artistry,o and
victimization akin to harming the original author's loved ones.n
At some point, sampling the music of others became a respected
and acceptable technique for a musical artist. This shift has not
happened in the world of fanfiction. This Article does not argue
whether fanfiction should be considered fair use. Indeed, such a
blanket proclamation is largely impossible, due to the case-by-case
nature of the fair use doctrine. However, this Article does argue that
the emotional arguments often used to support the illegality of
fanfiction actually weigh in favor of fanfiction on the fair use analysis.
This Article argues that a true fanfiction court case is necessary to
help strip from the topic the heated emotions that it provokes. Part I
examines the purposes of copyright law and the lack of a moral aspect
to the law. Part II discusses the relevant precedents on the subject of
fair use. Part III analyzes the emotional arguments raised against
fanfiction. Part IV argues that a true fanfiction precedent will be
useful to establish parameters and provide some rough guidelines as
to the important factors on which to dwell when debating fanfiction.
II. The Background of Copyright Law
A. The Purpose of U.S. Copyright Law
The idea of protecting copyrights was important enough to be
written directly into the Constitution. The clause, known
appropriately as the Copyright Clause, states: "The Congress shall
have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.... In a mere
9. See Gabaldon, supra note 7; Hobb, supra note 7 ("Fan fiction is unworthy of
you.").
10. Sunday Salon: Fanfiction, THE BOOK NUT, http://www.thebooknut.com/2010/
02/sunday-salon-fanfiction.html (Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Sunday Salon] ("[I]t's not
'real' writing. I feel like it's a bunch of first or second drafts out there, and that it's much
like brain candy (which I do admit, many books are): there's no inherent worth in creating
stories from someone else's imagined universe.").
11. See Gabaldon, supra note 7; George R. R. Martin, Someone Is Angry on the
Internet, NOT A BLOG (May 7, 2010, 7:35 PM), http://grrm.livejournal.com/151914.html;
see also Anne Rice, Important Message from Anne on 'Fan Fiction,' (last modified Aug.
18, 2010), http://www.annerice.com/Readerlnteraction-MessagesToFans.html ("It upsets
me terribly to even think about fan fiction with my characters."); Hobb, supra note 7.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The word "Science" meant "learning or knowledge"
at that time, a broader definition than we attach to it today. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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twenty-seven words, this clause blithely establishes a complex
balancing act that copyright owners, Congress, and the courts have
been attempting to maintain for centuries." The protection of works
and the promotion of progress seem like simple, straightforward, and
desirable goals, but they set up a central contradiction: They are, at
once, both necessary and dangerous to each other. This tug-of-war
between the rights of the author and the right of the public was
present from the very birth of copyright in the Statute of Anne, upon
which the American concept of copyright was based. 14  As Lord
Ellenborough wrote in an 1803 British case, "[Wlhile I shall think
myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right,
one must not put manacles upon science.""
The truth is that, while the more immediate and obvious
beneficiary of copyright law is the copyright holder who collects
royalties for his or her work, the copyright holder is not supposed to
be-and was never intended to be-the primary beneficiary of the
law. Rather, the primary beneficiary was meant to be the general
public, who would benefit from the rich creative society expected to
result from the encouragement of artists.1 U.S. courts have
13. Interestingly, the Federalist No. 43, written by James Madison, does not
recognize any such tension, describing the Copyright Clause as a straightforward provision
that "will scarcely be questioned." THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). Far from
finding a tension between the public and private interests invested in the clause, Madison
proclaims, "The public good full coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals."
Id.
14. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 232 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M.
Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647 (1943) ("Anglo-American copyright legislation begins
in 1709 with the Statute of 8 Anne, c. 19."); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268
F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001).
15. Carey v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170,170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803).
16. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved."); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985) ("[C]opyright is intended to
increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge."); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 ("[T]he
primary objective of copyright is to promote the Progress of Science...." (internal
quotations omitted)); see also id. at 241 ("[U]ltimate public access is the overriding
purpose of the constitutional provision.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal
Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651,
684 (1997) ("Copyright's purpose... is to encourage creativity for the public
interest...."); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1107 (1990) ("The copyright is not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on
authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate
activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public."); Michael G.
[33:2162
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recognized this again and again, seeking in their decisions to strike
the proper balance between author and public, in order to ensure that
Congress' statutes satisfy the Constitutional edict to promote science
and the arts.
Therefore, far from being an unlimited monopoly, authors' rights
have always been subject to two very important limitations:
(1) Authors can only receive protection for expression.
"[Elvery idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes
instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication." 8
(2) Much as the Statute of Anne did,19 Congress has codified a
doctrine of "fair use" that permits certain uses of copyrighted
works under a flexible four-factor test applied on a case-by-
case basis. 20 "[T]he 'fair use' defense allows the public to use
not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but
also expression itself in certain circumstances." 21
Copyright law exists in conjunction with a number of competing
public interests, with the ultimate purpose to promote progress in
science and the useful arts. Any evaluation of the permissiveness of a
given use of a copyrighted work must juggle such considerations.
B. Lack of Moral Rights in U.S. Copyright Law
There is a moral element to all acts committed in violation of a
law; but society recognizes some acts as being inherently immoral,
Anderson, et al., Market Substitution and Copyrights: Predicting Fair Use Case Law, 10 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 33, 34 (1993) ("[Tihe emphasis of copyright law is on the
benefits derived by the public from the creative efforts of authors. Reward to copyright
owners or authors is necessary, but of secondary consideration.").
17. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
18. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; see also Leval, supra note 16, at 1109; Suntrust, 268 F.3d
at 1264 ("It is partly through this idea/expression dichotomy that copyright law embodies
the First Amendment's underlying goal of encouraging open debate and the free exchange
of ideas.").
19. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994); Leval, supra
note 16, at 1105.
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2010).
21. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 ("From the infancy of
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been
thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose....").
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and recognizes others as being immoral solely by virtue of being
against the law.22 For instance, speeding on a highway may be illegal,
but many people would not see it as immoral.
By and large, copyright normally exists in an area of society where
its violation is not viewed as implicating morality.3 This is so even in
cases where the infringement would appear to be straightforward, and
its harm clearly understood.24 However, this attitude is somewhat
peculiar to U.S. copyright law. In many countries, copyright
embodies the moral aspect of the author's natural rights in his or her
work.25 While U.S. law has recognized some of the ideas that underlie
the moral rights of copyright in other countries, U.S. copyright law by
no means embraces the idea that copyright should recognize explicit
moral rights. 26  After all, U.S. copyright law exists to benefit the
22. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (2d pocket ed. 2001); see also Stuart P.
Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1557 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Malum in Se and
Malum Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) [hereinafter Copyright
Law] ("There is somehow, in the minds of many people who are writing currently, a kind
of absolute right of anybody to take anything, particularly if it's out there."). Scholarship
is full of articles noting that most people do not truly understand copyright law, suggesting
that it is disconnected from social mores. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 17, at 683; Sheldon
W. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
569, 576 (2001) [hereinafter Digital Threat] ("[T]here is a large class of consumer-
infringers (as well as consumers who are not infringers) who either do not consider the
copying involved to be an infringing act or do not believe that the law ought to inhibit or
punish their conduct."); Leval, supra note 16, at 1126 ("Copyright seeks to maximize the
creation and publication of socially useful material. Copyright is not a privilege reserved
for the well-behaved.... Copyright is not a reward for goodness but a protection for the
profits of activity that is useful to the public education.").
24. See, e.g., Scott Mervis, Downloading Goes Legit: Record Industry Crackdown
Steers Music Fans to Pay-Per-Song Online Services, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov.
12, 2003, at El (noting that most music downloaders do not see their actions as immoral);
see also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
the music downloading hosted by services like Napster infringed upon copyrights and
likely had no fair use defense).
25. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8D.01[A] (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed.).
26. See Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
("American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide
a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather
than the personal, rights of authors."); Choe v. Fordham Univ. School of Law, 920 F.
Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("There is no federal claim for violation of plaintiff's alleged
'moral rights."'); Leval, supra note 17, at 1128 ("I ... oppose converting our copyright law,
by a wave of a judicial magic wand, into an American droit moral. To do so would
generate much unintended mischief. Our copyright law has developed over hundreds of
years for a very different purpose and with rules and consequences that are incompatible
with the droit moral.").
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public, placing in doubt an author's moral right to the works. The
statute has been enacted with a view toward promotion of progress,
not punishment of evildoers.
IH. Fair Use as a Doctrine
The fair use doctrine, a flexible four-factor test, protects use of
copyrighted materials in order to ensure that copyright does not
"stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." 27
Codified by a section of statute titled "limitations on exclusive
rights," the doctrine directs inquiry into
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purpose; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.'
The fair use doctrine must be applied to the facts of each
individual case. 29 As the Supreme Court has warned, "[t]he task is
not to be simplified with bright-line rules," and courts must always
keep in mind "the purposes of copyright."o
A. Fair Use as Applied to Musical Sampling
1. Campbell
"Sampling" can be defined as "us[ing] or incorporate[ing] (an
audio segment of an original recording) in a new recording.""
27. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)); see also Leval, supra note 17, at 1109.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 107. These factors are non-exclusive, but courts seldom examine any
other factors. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549
(1985).
29. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
30. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 ("The
constitutional command, we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it enacts
copyright laws at all, create a system that promotes the Progress of Science." (internal
quotations omitted)); but see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802
(6th Cir. 2005) (establishing a bright-line rule for purposes of predictability).
31. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2009); see also Schietinger, supra note 9, at 211 ("Music sampling is the incorporation of
portions of an existing song into a new song.").
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Sampling has existed, arguably, as long as music has existed, but did
not become widespread until the rise of rap as a musical form.
"Rapper's Delight," a 1979 hit by the Sugar Hill Gang, is regarded as
one of the earliest popular singles to feature sampling,3 2 but it was 2
Live Crew's "Pretty Woman," which sampled Roy Orbison's "Oh,
Pretty Woman," that resulted in the leading Supreme Court case of
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
The Court in Campbell walked through every factor of the fair
use inquiry and eventually concluded that the 2 Live Crew sample
was a fair use of Orbison's copyrighted work.' In reaching its final
conclusion, the Court made several other intermediary conclusions.
First, the Court concluded that 2 Live Crew's song was a
transformative parody, which "add[ed] something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message."" A work need not be transformative to be
found to be fair use. However, a transformative work weighs more
heavily in favor of fair use, given that "the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works."" Indeed, as the Court noted,
Such works . . . lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright,
... and the more transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.
The Court moved quickly through an examination of the second
factor, noting that it was not very useful in the context of parody
because parodies would almost always involve expressive works."
The Court then moved to the third factor, examining the quality and
32. See Schietinger, supra note 8, at 212.
33. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
34. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-94.
35. Id. at 579. Justice Kennedy's concurrence expressed less certainty that the 2 Live
Crew song was a parody and warned against unduly expanding the definition of parody.
See id. at 599-600 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 579.
37. Id. The Court rested its transformative finding on its conclusion that "Pretty
Woman" was a parody. Id. at 579-85. However, parody is not the only type of
transformative work that could be permissible under fair use. See, e.g., Leval, supra note
16, at 1111 (enumerating possible permissible transformative uses); see also Campbell, 510
U.S. at 579.
38. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
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importance of the copyrighted work that was sampled. The Court
concluded that the 2 Live Crew song had not taken more of the
copyrighted work than was necessary for the purpose of its parody. 9
The fact that it did not substantially copy verbatim the copyrighted
work weighed in favor of a finding of fair use.44
Finally, the Court turned to the fourth enumerated fair use factor.
Here, the Court noted that the cognizable market harm in a fair use
defense is the harm of market substitution, either for the original
work itself or for licensed derivative works that the original
copyright-holder might wish to approve.41 The relevant inquiry in
Campbell was, therefore, the impact of the 2 Live Crew song on the
market for a rap version of the original "Oh, Pretty Woman." 42 The
Court noted that the record was silent on this issue, but also pointed
out that the "the commercial nature" of the 2 Live Crew song did not
"render ... it presumptively unfair." 43
2. Cases Post-Campbell
Campbell did not turn all music sampling cases into slam-dunk
fair use cases. In its wake, there have been many cases in which
copyright owners successfully sued for samples used without their
permission, often procuring favorable settlements.' Moreover, many
musicians now clear the rights to use the songs before sampling,
eliminating the need for a court case. 45  However, Campbell
unmistakably lent sampling an air of plausible legitimacy as a fair
use. 46 Before Campbell, one court found copyright infringement for
music sampling with a thundering, "Thou shalt not steal." 47  Such
morality-tinged language has mostly disappeared from cases since
Campbell.
Campbell's importance is not that it clarified the status of music
sampling, but rather that it muddied it. Sampling might infringe, but
39. Id. at 589.
40. Id. at 588-89.
41. Id. at 593.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 594.
44. See e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005);
Schietinger, supra note 9, at 215-16.
45. See id. at 220-21.
46. Prior to the careful analysis of Campbell, some courts had not even bothered to
conduct a fair use analysis and automatically found infringement where the artist sampled
copyrighted works. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
47. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183.
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it might also be fair use: The Supreme Court had concluded that rap
could be transformative parody, offering commentary to society that
deserved fair use protection. Although Campbell might not have
been necessary to James Murphy's status as a respected artist, the
decision certainly did not hurt.
B. Fair Use as Applied to Works of Fanfiction
"Fanfiction" is a term broadly used to encompass "any kind of
written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular
culture, such as a television show, and is not produced as
'professional' writing."48 Works of fanfiction run the gamut, from
hundred-word snippets known as "drabbles" 49 to epics running in the
hundreds of thousands of words.'o While fanfiction is by no means a
new phenomenon," the Internet has provided it with a game-
changing platform, allowing many more fans to more easily create
and share their work than before.52
Although fanfiction is a flourishing medium," there has been no
true case evaluating it under a fair use analysis. For instance, Warner
Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books involved a work created by a
fan, but the work in question was an encyclopedic reference book
about the original copyrighted material, not a piece of fiction spun off
from the original copyrighted work in some way.54 The fan work's
inconsistently transformative character swayed the court's fair use
analysis," and the fact that it used more of the original copyrighted
48. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 655.
49. See Drabble, FANLORE (last modified Nov. 6, 2010), http://fanlore.org/wikil
Drabble.
50. See Harry Potter FanFiction Archive, FANFICTION.NET (last updated Jan. 3,
2011), http://www.fanfiction.net/book/Harry-Potter/3/0/0/1/100/0/0/0/0/1/ (listing 3,206
works of Harry Potter fanfiction with more than 100,000 words).
51. In its modern incarnation, most scholars trace its genesis to the Star Trek fandom
in the 1960s. See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 655. However, stories fitting the definition of
fanfiction can be found throughout history. See id. at 652.
52. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's a Superhero: A Cultural
Theory of Mary Sue Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597, 600 (2007); see also
Copyright Law, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing, in a different context, the fact that digital
technology has "radically upset" the balance of copyright law).
53. On a single site, the book series Twilight alone has well over 100,000 "fics" listed
for it and the book series Harry Potter lists well over 400,000 "fics." See
FANFICTION.NET, http://www.fanfiction.net (last visited June 3, 2010).
54. 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
55. Id. at 544. The court noted that at times the fan work lapsed into mere verbatim
copying of the original copyrighted material, which detracted from its transformative
nature. Id.
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work than was necessary. These two factors would necessarily
dictate a different analysis when a work of fiction is involved as
opposed to a reference work."
1. Salinger
The closest analogue to a fanfiction fair use analysis is Salinger v.
Colting, which concerned a novel entitled 60 Years Later: Coming
Through the Rye, whose protagonist, Mr. C, is a 76-year-old Holden
Caulfield, the well-known protagonist of the J.D. Salinger novel The
Catcher in the Rye." The defendant's novel embodies typical
fanfiction activity: taking a recognizable character and re-imagining
them at a different stage of life." The court determined that the work
was not permissible fair use and enjoined its publication.
First, the court concluded that 60 Years Later was not a parody
because it "contain[ed] no reasonably discernible rejoinder or specific
criticism of any character or theme of Catcher."" Rather than
commenting on Holden Caulfield as a character, the purpose of 60
56. Id. at 547. The court found it telling that the fan work contained a great deal of
verbatim copying of "highly aesthetic expression," which tipped this factor away from a
finding of fair use. Id.
57. Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 544. The court found troubling the excessive
copying of "distinctive original language from the Harry Potter works," using "Rowling's
original expression," in the work's entries. Id. Presumably, much less direct copying of
original language would happen in a work of fiction. A similar implication occurs when
considering the "verbatim copying" of whole sentences from the Harry Potter books. Id.
at 547. Works of fanfiction seldom copy verbatim language, focusing on characters,
settings, and plots.
58. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70 (2nd Cir. 2010). This case recently settled,
with Colting agreeing not to publish the book in the United States or Canada until the
copyright on The Catcher in the Rye expires, but being able to publish it in other
international territories, as long as it was not marketed using reference to Salinger, The
Catcher in the Rye, or the litigation between the parties. See Andrew Albanese, "J.D.
Salinger Estate, Swedish Author Settle Copyright Suit," PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Jan. 11,
2011), available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-
news/article/45738-j-d-salinger-estate-swedish-author-settle-copyright-suit.html.
59. See, e.g., Secret Lily, Lily and James: Their Story of Love, FANFICTION.NET
(Nov. 6, 2004), http://fanfiction.mugglenet.com/viewstory.phpsid=182 (focusing on the
love story of Harry Potter's deceased parents), Jmaka, Just a Little Bit of History
Repeating, FANFICITON.NET (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.fanfiction.net/s/5730080/1/Just-a_
Little BitofHistory_ Repeating (telling a story about the marriage of Gilmore Girls
characters Luke and Lorelai, although the couple was not yet married at the time the
series ended).
60. Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). On appeal, the
court did not reverse the fair use analysis, but remanded for further consideration of the
irreparable harm prong of the preliminary injunction. 607 F.3d at 83-84.
61. Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
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Years Later was to "satisfy Holden's fans' passion" for his character.62
The insertion of J.D. Salinger as a character in 60 Years Later was
possibly, the court conceded, a criticism and commentary of Salinger,
but not of The Catcher in the Rye.63 While the court admitted that
there was some transformative element in the Salinger character in 60
Years Later, it was limited by the character's minor role in a work that
was largely not transformative." The court concluded that merely
aging the main character of a novel and altering the novel's setting
was not sufficient to make the use transformative.65 Finally, because
60 Years Later was to be sold for profit, the court found that the first
factor weighed against a finding of fair use.
After finding The Catcher in the Rye to be an expressive work,
which weighed the second factor against a finding of fair use, the
court then concluded that 60 Years Later took much more from The
Catcher in the Rye than was necessary for whatever transformative
commentary it was trying to make.67 The court disapproved mainly of
the use of the main character of The Catcher in the Rye." 60 Years
Later also was similar to The Catcher in the Rye in structure, in a way
that was not necessary to offer a commentary on Salinger (the only
transformative purpose the court had found the work to have). 69
Finally, the court found that 60 Years Later harmed the potential
market for any permissible The Catcher in the Rye sequels.70 The
court found that fair use should not protect the ability to publish
unauthorized sequels:
[B]ecause some artists may be further incentivized to create
original works due to the availability of the right not to
produce any sequels. This might be the case if, for instance,
an author's artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or
aspects of his character's story to the varied imaginations of
his readers, or if he hopes that his readers will engage in
62. Id. at 260.
63. Id. at 261.
64. Id. at 263.
65. Id. at 262.
66. Id. at 263.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 264-65.
69. Id. at 264-67.
70. Id. at 268.
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discussion and speculation as to what happened
subsequently."
Although 60 Years Later may be classified as fanfiction, the
overtly commercial purpose of the work makes it an imperfect
representation of the genre because most fanfiction is not-for-profit.72
Because the court weighed the novel's commercial nature against a
finding of fair use, Salinger is not an ideal fanfiction precedent.
2. Suntrust
Salinger can be contrasted with Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., another case involving a commercial work that may
inform future fanfiction analyses.73 In Suntrust the work entitled, The
Wind Done Gone told the story of Gone with the Wind from the
perspective of a newly created character that was inserted into the
original copyrighted story," another common fanfiction technique.
To the lower court, this was a clear infringement." Moreover, while
there was some transformative value to The Wind Done Gone, it was
no more transformative than any other sequel.77  Furthermore, the
court concluded that The Wind Done Gone used much more of the
copyrighted material from Gone with the Wind than was necessary to
communicate its farcical message." The court finally concluded that
there was an instant harm of market substitution for sequels of Gone
with the Wind, because The Wind Done Gone was not simply a
71. Id.
72. See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 664. A recent development in fanfiction that has
led to clashes is the rise of the use of fanfiction for charitable purposes. "Fanfic auctions"
in which readers bid for the services of fanfiction authors to write a story based on their
specifications, with the proceeds to benefit charity, are becoming more common. See
Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("Recently, a couple of people have drawn my attention to a
person who's been posting on various boards about fund-raising for an uninsured friend
named Stacie who has breast cancer. Her (the poster's) idea for fund-raising is to auction
off a customer-written piece of fan-fic. . . ."). Fanfiction written for such a commercial
purpose may change the analysis. But see Tushnet, supra note 16, at 672-73 (quoting
Gene Rodenberry).
73. 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
74. 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
75. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 50, at 601 (describing the new character in The
Wind Done Gone as a "Mary Sue," a common fanfiction trope).
76. Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 ("If the work tells the same story through
different eyes, then it infringes on the copyright owner's right to create and control
derivative works.").
77. Id. at 1378.
78. Id. at 1381.
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parody but also a sequel." Therefore, the plaintiff had demonstrated
a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright infringement
claim,' and the court granted a preliminary injunction."
The Court of Appeals, however, took a much broader view of
transformative parody. Parody, the court held, is not just about
humor or ridicule, but also includes any commentary upon or
criticism of the original copyrighted work.' Under this more
expansive definition, "the parodic character of [The Wind Done Gone
was] clear."" The Court of Appeals viewed The Wind Done Gone as
being "highly transformative," so much that it outweighed its
commercial purpose.' While the Court of Appeals appeared to agree
that The Wind Done Gone utilized more of Gone with the Wind than
was necessary to achieve its parodic purpose, the court also did not
think that automatically resulted in a finding that The Wind Done
Gone was not fair use." The "highly transformative" character of The
Wind Done Gone demonstrated that it would have little effect on the
market for Gone with the Wind or any of its licensed derivative
works.m The court concluded that the fair use factors favored The
Wind Done Gone and vacated the lower court's injunction."
IV. Emotional Arguments Frequently Raised Against
Fanfiction
Suntrust perfectly illustrates the inexact science of fair use under
copyright law: Two courts reached opposite conclusions on the
permissiveness of the same work of fiction.' Furthermore, the
contrast of Suntrust against Salinger is even more illuminating. There
is little apparent difference between the work in Suntrust and the
work in Salinger other than the fact that the work in Suntrust
79. Id. at 1383.
80. Id. at 1383-84.
81. Id. at 1386.
82. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001).
83. Id. at 1269.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1272-74.
86. Id. at 1275-76.
87. Id. at 1277.
88. Judge Marcus, in his concurring opinion, used even harsher language in
overturning the district court's judgment, finding that the transformative nature of The
Wind Done Gone was "not a close call." Id. (Marcus, J., concurring). "Even a cursory
comparison of the two texts reveals that The Wind Done Gone profoundly alters what it
borrows-indeed, at times beyond recognition." Id. at 1280 (Marcus, J., concurring).
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employed an original character as a narrator. Nothing could better
illustrate the case-by-case nature of fair use analysis.
Salinger provides footing for opponents to erect an argument
against fanfiction as fair use. Unfortunately, many authors ignore
these arguments in favor of more emotional appeals.89 The problem
with these arguments is that, far from proving fanfiction's illegality,
they actually tip in favor of a finding that much of fanfiction should
be considered fair use.0 Even worse, these arguments frequently
distort U.S. copyright law in an arguably unconstitutional fashion.9 1
A. The Argument That Fanfiction Is Not Aesthetically Pleasing
A frequent argument that authors raise against fair use is that fan
fiction is not good: "[A] terrible lot of fan-fic is outright cringe-worthy
and ought to be suppressed on purely aesthetic grounds."' Copyright
law does not permit making something illegal because one doesn't
think it's good.93 Instead, copyright law follows a doctrine of
"nondiscrimination," which recognizes that courts should not make
value judgments.94 "[T]he taste of any public is not to be treated with
89. See, e.g., Gabaldon, supra note 7; Sunday Salon, supra note 10; Lee Goldberg,
Another Day in FanFic, A WRITER'S LIFE (Apr. 12, 2005), http://leegoldberg.typepad
.com/a_writerslife/2005/04/another-day-in.html [hereinafter Another Day]; Hobb, supra
note 7; Stina Leicht, Fan Fiction, Ethics and Authors, HAVE ONLINE DICIONARY, WILL
TRAVEL (May 5, 2010, 1:35 p.m.), http://stinabat.livejournal .com/221884.html
[hereinafter Ethics and Authors]; Martin, supra note 11; Hot Button Topics, supra note 8;
Lee Goldberg, Fanficers [sic] in an Uproar, A WRITER'S LIFE (Oct. 14, 2004), http://lee
goldberg.typepad.com/a_writers-life/2004/10/fanficers-inan.html [hereinafter Uproar].
90. Some authors actually seem entirely unaware of the doctrine of fair use. See
Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("[Y]ou can't use someone's copyrighted characters for your own
purposes, no matter what those purposes are. Really."). This misunderstanding of
copyright law among authors also extends to arguments that fanfiction should not be
allowed because it is transformative-which is, indeed, a factor in favor of the allowance
of fanfiction. See Hobb, supra note 7 ("Every fan fiction I've read to date, based on my
world or any other writer's world, had [sic] focused on changing the writer's careful work
to suit the foible of the fan writer.").
91. See infra §§ IV.A, IV.B, IV.D.
92. Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("This is, [by the way], one reason why fan-fic versions of
popular characters so often seem superficial; they lack the depth that the Real Thing has-
the writer has merely grabbed at the broadest impression of the character, not built them
in complex layers.").
93. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 575, 582-583 ("Whether ...
parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair use. As Justice
Holmes explained, '[it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke."').
94. See Digital Threat, supra note 23, at 580.
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contempt." 5 There may be valid arguments against finding that
fanfiction is fair use. However, the fact that the work does not have
sufficient aesthetic value is not one of them."
B. The Argument That Fanfiction Is Not Real Writing
Fanfiction is frequently devalued as not being "real" writing.'
This is closely related to the aesthetic argument.8 Copyright only
protects creative expression." If the fanfiction is not creative
expression, then it is not copyrightable. That, however, is a different
question from whether it is infringing.'" It could be that the "not real
writing" argument, translated into legalese, really expresses the idea
that the work of fanfiction is not transformative enough.o' However,
this alone does not automatically make the work a copyright
infringement because other fair use factors remain.
95. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (Holmes,
J.).
96. Leval also argues against this: "[A] low estimation of the overall merit of the
secondary work can lead to a finding for the copyright owner in spite of a well-justified,
transformative use of the particular quotation that should justify a favorable finding under
the first factor." Leval, supra note 16, at 1113; see also Chander & Sunder, supra note 52,
at 615 ("Whether Mitchell's heirs must tolerate The Wind Done Gone did not turn on
wither either they or even the public liked the retelling." (emphasis in original)); Warner
Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[Its lack of
critical analysis, linguistic understanding, or clever humor is not determinative of whether
or not its purpose is transformative.").
97. See Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("[Y]ou'd prefer to exploit someone else's talent and
hard work, rather than go to the trouble of making your own way."); Sunday Salon, supra
note 11; Another Day, supra note 89; Hobb, supra note 7 ("Fan fiction is a good way to
avoid learning how to be a writer."); Ethics and Authors, supra note 89.
98. See Sunday Salon, supra note 10 (describing fanfiction as "a bunch of first or
second drafts" with "no inherent worth"); Hobb, supra note 7 ("Fan fiction is Paint-By-
Number art.").
99. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002).
100. See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 681 ("Fan fiction may not be copyrightable, but
that does not make it an infringing use....").
101. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) ("If, on the contrary,
the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's
work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its
commerciality, loom larger."). Importantly, however, a work does not have to be
transformative to be protected under fair use. See id. at 579. The fair use test is not
forgiving of shortcuts.
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C. The Argument That Characters Are Akin to Authors' Children
Many authors frequently describe fanfiction as being the
equivalent of an affront against their relatives." While the artistic
protectiveness for one's creation is understandable, it is not a valid
argument in U.S. copyright law. Artists have the right to control
derivative works of their creations. 103 If the fair use factors come out
the wrong way, artists can prevent that use of their work.i" However,
the purpose of copyright is not to prevent all use by others of an
artistic work.' It never has been.'" The very character of the fair
use test illustrates this, as it protects most strongly those uses of an
artist's creation that the artist would never permit. Arguably, the
more that a fanfiction work criticizes or parodies the original work,
the more that fanfiction is a fair use." Thus, the argument that
fanfiction should not be permitted because it transforms the original
authors' characters mirrors the argument for exactly why fanfiction
should be permitted under copyright law
102. See Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("[L]et us just say that there's a difference between
someone dating red-haired men, and the same someone trying to seduce my husband....
I wouldn't like people writing sex fantasies for public consumption about me or members
of my family-why would I be all right with them doing it to the intimate creations of my
imagination and personality?"); Someone Is Angry on the Internet, supra note 11 ("My
characters are my children, I have been heard to say. I don't want people making off with
them, thank you."); Hobb, supra note 7 (comparing fanfiction to PhotoShopping a family
photo).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
104. See 4 NIMMER § 13.05.
105. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574-77 ("From the infancy of copyright
protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought
necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose ....
106. See id. at 575-76.
107. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (11th Cir.
2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) ("To the extent the Suntrust [sought to impose editorial
restrictions] to preserve Gone With the Wind's reputation, or protect its story from 'taint,'
however, it may not now invoke copyright to further that goal. Of course, Suntrust can
choose to license its derivative however it wishes and insist that those derivatives remain
free of content it deems disreputable. Suntrust may be vigilant of Gone With the Wind's
public image-but it may not use copyright to shield Gone With the Wind from unwelcome
comment, a policy that would extend intellectual property protection 'into the precincts of
censorship,' in Pat Conroy's words.").
108. See id. at 1281 (Marcus, J., concurring) ("A work whose overriding purpose and
character is parodic and whose borrowing is slight in relation to its parody will be far less
likely to cause cognizable harm than a work with little parodic content and much
copying." (internal quotes omitted)); see also Tushnet, supra note 17, at 674 ("[T]he more
clearly a parody departs from the copyright owner's vision, the more likely it is that fair
use will be found.").
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D. The Argument That Only Works in the Public Doman Should Be Used
Another frequent argument employed by authors against
fanfiction is that it should only be used with public domain works.'"
This sort of fanfiction is actually very common, popular, and
lucrative."o Use of public domain works does eliminate the copyright
question. However, an argument that fanfiction should only be
confined to public domain works is unfairly limiting, and completely
ignores the valid and important purpose of the fair use doctrine. The
Supreme Court in Campbell definitively found that fair use can exist
for protected works."' This applies to fanfiction as much as to other
types of transformative fair uses. U.S. copyright law permits
sufficiently transformative works, even if they would otherwise be
infringing protected works. To propose limiting all fanfiction to
public domain works is to read fair use entirely out of U.S. copyright
law-a radical reevaluation of the regime.
E. The Argument That Fanfiction Writers Should Seek Permission First
Many authors argue that fanfiction is permissible if the author of
the original work has given permission.112 This has precedent in the
music sampling world; despite Campbell, much music sampling today
takes place in an organized licensing environment.'13 However, the
idea that fanfiction should only exist if there is permission likewise
ignores the reason for the fair use analysis. Indeed, the very focus of
fair use is that it protects uses the author would not otherwise
109. See Gabaldon, supra note 8 ("[I1f you feel you just can't get noticed on your own
merits (and that being noticed is worth whatever it takes): you just do it with characters
that are no longer under copyright.").
110. See e.g., id. ("[S]ome writers do this to good-or at least profitable-effect. Note
PRIDE AND PREJUDICE AND ZOMBIES, for instance, or the many (many, many,
many) imitators of Sherlock Holmes."). Indeed, the popularity of fanfiction of public
domain works undercuts other arguments that fanfiction is not "real" writing and not
aesthetically pleasing enough to be permitted. Fanfiction about public domain works
appears to be both.
111. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-94; see also Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1277.
112. See Martin, supra note 11 ("Consent, for me, is at the heart of this issue. If a
writer wants to allow or even encourage others to use their worlds and characters, that's
fine."); Hot Button Topics, supra note 7; Uproar supra note 89 ("Of course, I believe that
ALL 'fanfic' is inappropriate unless the writer has the consent of the author or copyright
holder."); Ethics and Authors, supra note 89 ("Ask permission to borrow it first.").
113. See Schietinger, supra note 8, at 220-21 (also discussing the drawbacks of being
required to seek clearance). The court in Bridgeport explained that it was desirable to
make licensing more appealing than litigation. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005). However, the court does not address what happens if a
copyright-holder refuses to license a use, especially if such use is parodic or otherwise
similarly transformative. Id.
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permit.11 4  Furthermore, music sampling clearance has been a
successful regime at least in part because the original copyright holder
has the prospect of sizeable returns as a result of the sampling."' This
is less likely to happen in the fanfiction genre, where the vast majority
of works are not not commercialized, thus reducing an author's
incentive to permit such use of his or her work."'
114. See 4 NIMMER § 13.05[A][4] ("[T]he logic of prior cases ... construe[s] this fourth
factor as favoring fair use to the extent defendant's work fills a market niche that plaintiff
has no interest in occupying."); Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 597 (1994) (noting that fair use
"protects works we have reason to fear will not be licensed by copyright holders....")
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) ("The law
grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly in their expressive works. It should not
also afford them windfall damages for the publication of the sorts of works that they
themselves would never publish, or worse, grant them a power of indirect censorship").
This purpose is especially evident in the evaluation of market harm prong of the fair use
analysis. The relevant market to examine are market "that creators of original works
would in general develop or license others to develop." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. One
could try to circumvent this issue by instituting a compulsory licensing program. See
Digital Threat, supra note 23, at 593. However, it is unclear how implementation of such a
program would work in practice.
115. See Schietinger, supra note 8, at 221. Indeed, legal cases generally result in the
original copyright holder receiving what it would have received had the sampler sought a
license: royalties and credit. See id. at 213 (noting that both MC Hammer and Vanilla Ice
were forced to provide royalties to the owners of the original copyrighted songs they
sampled). While almost all fanfiction authors provide credit to the original author as a
matter of course, see Tushnet, supra note 17, at 679, royalties are virtually nonexistent in
the largely uncommercialized fanfiction world, see id. at 664, which gives authors little
incentive to grant licenses for fanfiction. Those who permit fanfiction often do so for the
same emotional reasons that other authors oppose it. See, e.g., W.A. Hoffman, The Circle
of Art: Fanfics, Angst, and Walkouts, THE ALIEN PERSPECTIVE (May 26, 2008),
http://thealienperspective.blogspot.com/2008/05/circle-of-art-fanfics-angst-and.html;
Catherynne M. Valente, Fan the Flames, RULES FOR ANCHORITES (May 10, 2010, 1:24
PM), http://yuki-onna.livejournal.com/582169.html; Cecilia Tan, My Statement on Fan
Fiction & Fanworks, CECILIATAN.COM (May 9, 2010), http://blog.ceciliatan.com
/?pagejid=331.
116. Despite this, many authors have come out in favor of fanfiction. See, e.g.,
Tushnet, supra note 16, at 672-73 (quoting Gene Roddenberry); Comic Relief Live Chat
Transcript, ACcio QUOTE! (Mar. 2001), http://www.accio-quote.orglarticles/2001/0301-
comicrelief-staff.htm ("Carrie: How do you feel about thousands of fans writing fanfiction
about your books, and having them posted on the Internet? It's wonderful ... I love writing
more than almost anything in the world so the idea that Harry has inspired other people to
write makes me very happy."); Mercedes Lackey, News: Concerning Fanfiction, THE
WORLD OF MERCEDES LACKEY (last modified Aug. 1. 2010), http://www.mercedeslackey
.com/news.html; New Fanfiction Policy, JIM BUTCHER (Apr. 29, 2010, 11:46 PM),
http://www.jim-butcher.com/posts/2010/new-fanfiction-policy. Furthermore, many
fanfiction-hosting sites on the Internet also respect the wishes of authors who have come
out against fanfiction. See, e.g., Content Guidelines, FANFICTION.NET (last modified Jan.
3, 2011), http://www.fanfiction.net/guidelines. It is unclear if this is done out of fear of a
copyright infringement suit or out of simple respect for the author's wishes. See id.
2011]1 177
V. The Influence of Emotional Arguments on Fanfiction
Analysis
The arguments that authors advance when they argue against
copyright belong in a regime without fair use-a regime that would
ignore the central purpose of U.S. copyright."' Such a conclusion is
not only potentially untenable under the Constitution, but is also
undesirable."' "The public's interest in free expression . . . is
significant."" There is no question that courts have, throughout the
history of copyright law, sought to protect that public interest.
However, there is also no question that courts are inevitably
swayed by value arguments. This should not be the case,120 but such
influence is inevitable. 2 ' Furthermore, value is a chicken-and-egg
argument: Campbell did not base its decision on the popularity of
music sampling, but surely the popularity informed Campbell's
understanding of the critical commentary value of "Pretty Woman." 21
While acceptance of fanfiction is slowly growing, 23 it is seldom
viewed as having artistic value.124 This emotional artistic reaction to
117. See Leval, supra note 16, at 1135 ("Fair use is not a grudgingly tolerated
exception to the copyright owner's rights of private property, but a fundamental policy of
copyright law.").
118. Possibly because moral rights do not have a historical basis in this country, any
attempt to try to introduce them into the copyright argument could muddle the fanfiction
situation even more. For instance, some fans seem to believe that they have a "moral
right" to use characters they love. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 657-58.
119. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2nd Cir. 2010).
120. See Leval, supra note 16, at 1107 (remarking on the "utilitarian goal" of copyright
and noting that "[d]ecisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to
result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns," which has led to massive
confusion in the field).
121. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 16, at 682-83 (speculating that a court's "belief that
[the author of a proposed sequel] was not a true creator may explain its willingness to
condemn him as an infringer").
122. There is no indication that sampling has been discouraged as an art form by the
Bridgeport decision, as sampling continues to occur and is favorably regarded (albeit
probably also licensed). See Frere-Jones, supra note 1, at 39. However, that decision
happened years after the place of sampling in the music world was well-established.
123. Fanfiction contests, in which entrants are encouraged to write fanfiction and
winners are chosen to receive a prize, have become commonplace. See, e.g., Scholastic
Brings Back Dear America Series Per Fan Demand, YOUTH MARKETS ALERT, May 15,
2010, at 1; Elaine Abdalla, Tsubasacon Offers Anime, Gaming Fun, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (WV), Oct. 1, 2009, at 6E; Community Briefs, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(TENN.), July 8, 2009, at B6; Metro Libraries Plan Contests, OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 18, 2009,
at 2D; No Twilight Official Guide Until 2009, KANSAS CITY STAR (MO.), Nov. 26, 2008;
The List: 'Twilight' Online, POST STANDARD, July 31, 2008, at D1; Area Book Stores
Welcome 'Breaking Dawn' with Events, DOMINION POST IN MORGANTOWN (WV), July
30,2008; Literary Calendar, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (KY.), Sept. 9,2007, at Eli.
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fanfiction has inevitably colored courts' responses to it. Although not
explicitly mentioned in the Salinger decision, J.D. Salinger's well-
known aversion to further use of his work surely influenced the
court's thinking on whether the fan-written work was a "fair use." 125
However, the use of the word "fair" in "fair use" does not mean that
it is fair to the author's wishes. Rather, it means that it is fair to the
purposes of copyright.
None of the emotional arguments frequently raised against
fanfiction support a blanket proclamation that none of it is fair use.126
Truthfully, much of fanfiction may very well not be fair use.
However, a true test case of fanfiction, logically evaluating each
factor, would be invaluable in moving the fanfiction debate past the
emotions of the participants. The argument should focus not on the
emotions of the author or the quality of the writing, but on the fair
use factors: on the purpose, character, and possible transformative
nature of the work, on the amount of the original copyrighted work
used, on the nature of the original copyrighted work, and on the
effect on the market of the original copyrighted work. These are the
factors that best protect the advancement of the twin goals of U.S.
copyright.12
124. The story of Helene Hegemann is an interesting one. Ms. Hegemann lifted
passages in her novel from a previously published novel, without providing credit. See
Nicholas Kulish, Author, 17, Says It's 'Mixing,' Not Plagiarism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/world/europe/l2germany.html. Ms.
Hegemann argued that it was nothing more than "mixing" to create something new,
similar to music sampling. Id. Ms. Hegemann's novel was announced as a finalist at the
Leipzig Book Fair. Id. This announcement provoked outrage, see, e.g., Superheidi,
Helene Hegemann's Novel 'Axolotl Roadkill' Plagiarized, FANGIRLTASTIC (Feb. 14,
2010), http://www.fangirltastic.com/content/helene-hegemanns-novel-axolotl-roadkill-
plagiarized; Ethics and Authors, supra note 89, in stark contrast to the praise that was
heaped upon the similarly unauthorized mixing album The Grey Album. See, e.g., Ben
Greenman, The Mouse That Remixed, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.newyorker.comlarchive/2004/02/09/040209ta talk-greenman. While Ms.
Hegemann's work may not be fanfiction, strictly speaking, it is worth noting that there is
still doubt about the artistic value of "mixing" in a literary work.
125. See, e.g., Charles McGrath, J.D. Salinger, Literary Recluse, Dies at 91, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/books/29salinger
.html.
126. The emotional arguments exist on both sides of the aisle. There is some
indication that the perception of the general public is that all noncommercial use is fair
use. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 665. This is not true, and seems grounded in an idea of
moral fairness that does not exist in the law. See, e.g., id. at 683 (arguing that fans believe
fanfiction should be permissible based on "concepts of fairness").
127. It could be that a court would depart from this established fair use analysis for
fanfiction, viewing it as different from sampling. Some authors have suggested that maybe
copyright should develop so that different tests are used for different creative works. See
Copyright Law, supra note 24, at 9-10; Digital Threat, supra note 24, at 590. The law
THE BETTrER ANGELS OF OUR FANFICTION 17920111
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.. [
VI. Conclusion
The debate over fanfiction is emotionally fraught, because, both
sides conclude, fanfiction is about love."' "Love," however, is not
part of copyright law. 29 Criticism and commentary, market harm and
commercialization, are. Not all fanfiction is necessarily fair use.
However, neither is all fanfiction necessarily infringing. And,
especially, none of it is "immoral."
seems to be moving in that direction, with special treatment for certain types of work. See
Digital Threat, supra note 24, at 591. It could be, therefore, that the standards of parody in
a musical work are laxer than the standards of parody in a work of fiction. See id. at 591
("Different classes of work may well merit different treatment, with perhaps differing
scope of protection and differing definitions of infringing activity. Such particularistic
treatment may be most appropriate in the application of the judge-made concept of fair
use, recognizing that more latitude is required for certain kind [sic] of works than for
others.").
128. See George R. R. Martin, A Few More Last Words, Not a Blog (May 8, 2010: 8:25
p.m.), http://grrm.livejournal.com/152340.html ("It is all about love. On both sides.").
129. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 12, at 1135 (urging "focus on the utilitarian, public-
enriching objective of copyright . .. resisting the impulse to import extraneous policies").
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